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Abstract
This paper is an attempt to implement Gilles Deleuze’s theory of
the series and the event, and the related function of the empty
square (as formulated primarily in The Logic of Sense), in relation to
the geopolitical regime comprising ‘Israel proper’ and the system of
occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The purpose of this
exercise is to help establish a practical access to Deleuze’s philosophies,
and to offer a clinical account of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian
territories.
Keywords: Israel/Palestine, occupation, Deleuze, empty square, series,
event
The regime of Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories of the
West Bank and Gaza, following the Six Day War of June 1967,1 has
become increasingly theorised, especially since the outbreak of the first
Palestinian intifada (in Arabic, literally ‘shaking-off’, or ‘revolt’) in 1987.
By deploying nuts and bolts from Deleuze’s conceptual ‘toolboxes’,
my aim is to proffer an analysis of the event of the occupation
that frees us from prevailing views of the system of relationships
between Israel and the Palestinian people. Specifically, the paper joins
recent critical research deconstructing consensual representations of the
conflict, representations that for decades have divorced the Israeli socius
and its internal organisations of hobbled citizenship for non-Jews from
the oppressive system of occupation in the territories. Hitherto, Zionist
representations of the conflict have been successfully territorialised into
ideological and political arenas, so as to mobilise most of the Jewish
citizenry into the daily management, at both micro and macro levels,
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of oppression against Palestinians, and to disengage the international
community from adopting a deep critical standpoint towards Israel.
By injecting Deleuze’s theoretical tools into critical readings of the
conflict, we hope to contribute to ongoing interventions aimed at
deterritorialising the workings of the desiring-machines involved in the
social production of the real in the region between the Mediterranean
Sea and the River Jordan. To this end, in the main I examine critically
three recent and significant works on the occupation: Eyal Weizman’s
(2007) Hollow Land, Neve Gordon’s (2008) Israel’s Occupation, and
Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir’s (2008) This Regime Which is Not One:
Occupation and Democracy Between the Sea and the River (1967–).
In addition, the analysis will refer to a highly recommended recent
volume which compiles diverse studies of the ‘prevailing modalities of
the occupation regime in various periods and their order of significance’.
Rather than convey a uniform image of the occupation, these studies
‘highlight disparate rationalities and mechanisms of power whose
heterogeneity reinforces the overall effectiveness and perseverance of this
regime’ (Ophir et al. 2009: 22).
These critical works will serve here as a platform for highlighting the
traits of the ‘system’ of the occupation – or, in Deleuze’s terms, ‘how
the series connect to make the structure’ (see Deleuze 1990, 1994,
2004). As Lecercle explains, for Deleuze, the series ‘define a field of
problems, and their terms are correlated through a relation subject to
constant variation and displacement’ (Lecercle 2002: 108). What we
are interested in is the sense of the event of the occupation as a surface
effect produced by that displacement, which Deleuze explains in terms
of the circulation of a paradoxical element – which needs to be explained
here contextually – crisscrossing and zipping together the series of the
structure of the occupation. This element is what Deleuze refers to in The
Logic of Sense as the ‘empty place or square’ (also named ‘the aleatory
point’, and, in Difference and Repetition, ‘the dark precursor’) – whose
function is to explain the points of contact between the series and how
they interconnect (Deleuze 2004: 184–9). As Deleuze puts it:
Given two heterogeneous series, two series of differences, the precursor [the
empty square] plays the part of the differenciator of these differences. In this
manner, by virtue of its own power, it puts them into immediate relation to
one another. (Deleuze 1994: 119)

This seemingly structuralist tint to Deleuze’s philosophy is nevertheless
consistent with his emphasis on univocity, and with the critiques
he and Guattari make of biunivocal structuralism (in both volumes
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of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, particularly in their critique of
the despotic signifier and the ‘binary logic of dichotomy’, which
dominates psychoanalysis and linguistics). In fact, this approach serves
to highlight the production of sense taking place – since ‘sense is
produced by nonsense and its perpetual displacement’ (Deleuze 1990:
71) – thereby keeping the structure open to constant movement and
deterritorialisation and staving off stratification and the hierarchical
functions of a signifier. Here it is worth bearing in mind that by
examining a particular series of historico-political relations, what is
productive, in terms of resistance, is to understand the sense of these
relations not as ‘a phenomenon of degradation representing a deviation
from the true order’, but as an involutionary process of becoming
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 237–8) in which forces change in nature
(intensity) and a real difference is actualised (Deleuze 1994: 231–46,
252–6).
Accordingly, the occupation cannot be thought of as an infection or
disturbance of the normal functioning of the formally democratic regime
of ‘Israel proper’ (assuming that, when it finally ends, the regime will be
cured of the disease), but must rather be understood as a device which,
by maintaining a fluid communication with the regime of ‘Israel proper’,
both explains the Jewish state’s practices and meanings and opens them
to contestation. As we shall see, the ‘empty square’ of the occupation
appears as emerging from the various combinations of historically and
spatially changing modalities of the oppression of Palestinians across the
‘Green Line’,2 creating intricate relations of abandonment (cf. Agamben
1998).

I. From ‘Hollow Land’ to ‘One Regime’
Eyal Weizman’s Hollow Land (2007) offers a good starting point,
mainly in view of the attention his work has gained among Deleuze
researchers. Weizman is among the non-resident Israeli academics who
have been openly critical of the occupation project. In a nutshell, his
book expands upon the evaluation of the ‘matrix of control’ of the Israeli
occupation, beyond the traditional bounds of political territoriality, to
the vertical dimension – extending, that is to say, not just to the land
surface, but to the underground domain and to the airspace as well, all
of which play a part in the logic of segregation from, and control of, the
Palestinian people and its land. According to Weizman, Israel’s elastic
geography of nomadic domination responds to multiple and diffused
power sources, in relation to which architecture fulfils a functional
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role. Indeed, Weizman contends that the occupation – as a plane of
production – has developed architectural properties. The reason we lack
an intelligible reading of the occupation, he says, is because we overlook
verticality. He builds on the concept of the ‘politics of verticality’
to outline the main patterns of a three-dimensional domination,
compounded by a patchwork of sealed ‘islands’ of Palestinian territory
which – like the subterranean water aquifer and the militarised space
above – fall under Israeli control. An intricate web of roads, tunnels
and bridges has been woven to secure Israeli colonies – which are
generally sited on the summits of mountainous terrain – within the
Palestinian territories. Moreover, Israel uses roads and land confiscation
to curb Palestinian development, and to restrict Palestinian movement
by introducing a ‘forbidden road regime that [limits] the inhabitants’
access to major traffic arteries in the West Bank’ (Gordon 2008: 137).
As a consequence, the diverse boundaries of the conflict are revealed at
varying topographical latitudes (Weizman 2007: 12).
It is in this context that the subterranean and aerial Palestinian
resistance in Gaza – specifically, the tunnels to Egyptian territory for
the smuggling of goods and arms, and rocket attacks on Israeli towns
near the border – should be understood.3 For Weizman, this 3-D logic
multiplies Palestinian geography ‘to separate the inseparable’ (Weizman
2007: 15). This is the same logic of partition which, as Ilan Pappe
argued recently (Pappe 2009), has weighed upon both Palestinians and
Israelis like a curse, condemning them for nearly half a century to seeing
the conflict exclusively in terms of partition. Ultimately, we are left
with a hollowed-out land inhabited in layers, and controlled through
them.
From a Deleuzian point of view, Weizman’s work has become known
among scholars not only for the vocabulary he employs to describe
the Palestinian space (elastic territories, multiple and diffused sources
of power, nomadic domination, vertical strata, connecting flows, and
so on), but mainly for an unexpected implementation of Deleuze and
Guattari’s spatial concepts. ‘Walking through walls’ was a trademark
of the military campaign waged by the IDF (Israel Defence Forces)
against the West Bank city of Nablus in April 2002 (during the second
intifada), amidst claims that it was based on a particular implementation
of critical theory, including works by Deleuze and Guattari. Terms such
as ‘inverse geometry’, ‘nomadic terrorists’, ‘swarming and infestation’,
‘non-linearity’ and ‘deterritorialisation’ became part of the IDF’s lexicon
during the planning and execution of its offensive, which involved
moving military units through domestic interiors – ‘punching holes
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through party walls, ceilings and floors’ – and avoiding the use of
streets and conventional urban open spaces (Weizman 2007: 185–6). As
Shimon Naveh, a former co-director of the IDF’s Operational Theory
Research Institute (since closed), explained:
Several of the concepts in A Thousand Plateaus became instrumental for us [in
the IDF] . . . allowing us to explain contemporary situations in a way we could
not have otherwise explained. It problematised our own paradigm . . . Most
important was the distinction [Deleuze and Guattari] have pointed out
between the concepts of ‘smooth’ and ‘striated’ space . . . [which accordingly
reflected] the organisational concepts of the ‘war machine’ and the ‘state
apparatus’. In the IDF we now often use the term ‘to smooth out space’ when
we want to refer to operation in a space in such a manner that borders do not
affect us. (Cited in Weizman 2007: 200–1).

For Naveh, theories do not have a soul, nor do they strive for
utopian socio-political ideals (‘theory is not married to socialist ideals’).
He recognised that theories are based primarily on methodological
principles, and focused on their capacity ‘to disrupt and subvert the
existing political, social, cultural, or military order’ (cited in Weizman
2007: 215). Naveh is correct – nor should his claim be regarded as
particularly outrageous. In fact, the case is illustrative. The point is not
what can be done with theory or literature – which in any event cannot
be foreseen – but how our actions relate to our desiring-production.
The expectation that a ‘correct’ reading of Deleuze and Guattari might
transform IDF officers and Zionist politicians into anti-segregationists or
even humanists is a notion drawn from a classical Marxist interpretation
of thought and action. It is not false consciousness that impedes
revolutionary action, but rather the type of desiring-machines at work,
and the entrapment of desire by interest (cf. Buchanan 2008: 38–133). In
the case of ‘walking through walls’, the unconscious (collective) libidinal
investment of the IDF assemblage ‘continues to invest the former
body, the old form of power, its codes, and its flows’ (Deleuze and
Guattari 1983: 347). In this instance, ‘desire is enslaved to a structured
molar aggregate’ – namely, Zionist colonialism – and invested with the
changing forms of power deployed by the system of occupation (348).
Thus, there is nothing particularly revolutionary in the IDF’s reading of
Deleuze and Guattari – not because it facilitated domination and killing,
but because the syntheses that it allowed for were already predisposed
to given and fixed military and political interests, rendering the desiringproduction paranoid and reactionary (366–7). In other words, it takes
more than reading Marx to become Che Guevara.
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To return to the issue at hand, Weizman – like other scholars of
the conflict before him (Benvenisti 1984, 1986, 1987; Kimmerling
1989; Peled and Shafir 2002; Yiftachel 2006; Raz-Krakotzkin
2007)4 – ‘define[s] the limits of the discussion in terms of the boundaries
of the space of control’ (Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 371), and refers to a
relationship or dynamic of dependence between the Israeli regime within
the Green Line (‘Israel proper’) on the one hand, and the Israeli military
regime in the occupied Palestinian territories on the other. However, it
is a mistake to limit the discussion of the regime to the boundaries of
Israel proper, since ‘there is no such geopolitical entity’ (371): the real
geographical realm of Israel proper extends beyond the Green Line as far
as the River Jordan, as does its economy and its politics. As Azoulay and
Ophir explain, the problem is that these scholars uncritically accept the
premise that the two entities are somehow separate, thereby ignoring the
effects of the occupation on the regime of Israel proper. As a result, they
perpetuate the prevailing view that the Palestinian territories constitute
an ‘outside’ where everything that occurs – however appalling morally and
politically – does not compel us to re-conceptualise and analyse the Israeli
regime as a whole, and can therefore be described without reflecting upon the
fundamental characteristics of the Israeli regime. (Azoulay and Ophir 2008:
46–7)

This circumscribed view of the effects of the occupation is also apparent
in Gordon’s Foucauldian analysis of the occupation. It is most notable,
for example, in his book’s final passage, where he suggests that a solution
to the conflict hinges solely on the emergence of Palestinian sovereignty
in the territories (Gordon 2008: 225) – or, as he puts it, on re-connecting
the Palestinian people with its land. As I hope to establish in this
paper (apart from placing the focus on problematisation rather than
resolution), if we wish to deal more effectively with the event of the
occupation and reach a more positive problematisation of the conflict
for all concerned, we must link the processes and changes occurring
within the territories with those within Israel proper. As Azoulay and
Ophir point out: ‘The occupation of the Territories in 1967 represents
a rupture-line in the history of Israel, because as a result of this event
a radical change took place in the Israeli regime’ (Azoulay and Ophir
2008: 395).
The event of the occupation, as we shall see, obliges us to revise our
concepts and understanding of the nature of the Israeli regime if we
wish truly to grapple with this event on the political level. One facet
of this effort must involve new formulations of what can be said in
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our discourse concerning the conflict: we must intersect and make more
immanent connections between the Palestinians of the West Bank and
Gaza, and Israeli citizens and residents (Palestinians, Jews and others),
and between their respective material and cultural interactions.
This, in fact, is the analytical innovation introduced by Ariella
Azoulay and Adi Ophir in their book This Regime which is not One
(2008). Beyond a mere demonstration that the two regimes are somehow
connected, they demonstrate how the oppressive regime of Israeli
occupation (in the West Bank and Gaza) and the formal democracy in
Israel proper, form a single political regime consisting of two discrete,
but symbiotic, systems of control. According to Azoulay and Ophir,
despite their dissimilarities, these two political systems have become
increasingly integrated since the start of military occupation in 1967 into
a single body of domination. As they explain:
At the end of the 1960s the state of affairs of the Occupation became a
national project; in the 1970s it became larger; and at one point at the
beginning of the 1980s the project was institutionalised and became a regime
of its own, almost differentiated but not totally separated from the ethnodemocratic regime in place within Israel of the pre-June 1967 borders.
(Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 395)

By thoroughly investigating the system of domination of the ‘one
structure’ and embarking on a comprehensive counter-actualisation
of the given, the main purpose of these two writers is to decipher
the conditions that allowed for the emergence of such a hybrid
political construct. They also maintain that, after four decades of
military occupation, the Israeli political regime has doubled in size
in all respects, through a carefully engineered form of production of
separation between its two parts – one maintained by proximity and
interconnection – compounding the impact of this ‘inclusive exclusion’
upon the Palestinians (Ophir et al. 2009). In the following section, I shall
try to show how a Deleuzian framework might expand upon Azoulay
and Ophir’s main contention vis-à-vis Israel’s schizoid redoubling in size,
and proceed from there to enhance and expand the optical resolution of
their analysis, before finally offering a clinical diagnosis of the state of
forces of the ‘one regime’.

II. Two That Are ‘One’.
Given that Azoulay and Ophir’s book has so far appeared only
in Hebrew, I will briefly outline its structure and rationale.
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The fundamental question addressed by its authors concerning the Israeli
project for Palestine after the partition war of 1948 – and especially
after the conquest of the Palestinian territories in 1967 – is ‘how the
institutionalised and prolonged domination over the Palestinians has
shaped and changed the Israeli regime’ (Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 19).
Based on this question, the researchers aim at shedding light on the
nature of the Israeli regime that is simultaneously ‘one’ body and yet
more than one. The study sets out from two central premises: first, as
noted above, that ‘the debate cannot be limited to Israel proper, since
such a geopolitical entity does not exist’ (Azoulay and Ophir 2008:
371); and, second, that: ‘The occupied territories are an integral part
of the Israeli system of domination, [involving] a relentless effort to
preserve them as an ‘outside’ . . . this being the Israeli regime’s primary
concern’ (57).
The authors’ task is to distil the general principles of the Israeli regime,
which must be seen as extending ‘from the Mediterranean Sea to the
Jordan River’. This undertaking involves two major methodological
measures: first, to describe empirically how the occupation regime
works, by focusing on ‘the forms of Israeli domination over the
Palestinian territories’ (Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 13); second, to link
these modalities with their reverberating practices within Israel proper,
and to synthesise their abstractions of the system of the occupation with
the more general and known patterns of the ethnocratic regime within
Israel proper.
What distinguishes Azoulay and Ophir’s work is the way in which
they present the problem of the occupation. While drawing on
Foucault – without doing so overtly – their proposed analysis also owes
much to Deleuze. First, by creating new concepts, the work removes
restrictions that restricted the scope of critical understanding in previous
analyses. For instance, they point out that while most scholars agree that
the central distinction to be taken into account when conceptualising the
Israeli regime is the ethno-national distinction between Jews and nonJews, they omit the significant category of non-citizens, without which
the formation of Israeli mainstream subjectivity cannot be understood
(Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 377–9). Second, they distinguish between
the actual and the virtual, allowing the conditions of the boundaries of
the structures in question to be deduced, and thereby enabling a mobile
understanding moving between the two realms.
Azoulay and Ophir’s analysis does not offer programmatic solutions
to the problematic of the occupation; rather, they search for what
emerged to become the conditions of a project (the occupation) in the

The Empty Square of the Occupation 389
course of its evolution over four decades. These conditions set out
the ‘solubility’ of the problem of occupation in a Deleuzian fashion:
they point to the significant changes in the historical ‘graph’ of the
occupation, to the ‘zeros’ of its function (cf. Deleuze 1994: 171; 180–1).
These are the points where distributions in the given diverged, illusions
of identification and significations took root, and the occupation was
established as the new possible of the Zionist–Palestinian structure.
More importantly, it becomes clear from Azoulay and Ophir’s analysis
that the significant points of inflection in the ‘problem’ of the occupation
do not exhaust the problem itself but should be seen as a manifestation
of what has varied, and how it has done so, throughout the observed
systems – in the form of a single infinite series of answers to a problem
that is itself constantly evolving.
Azoulay and Ophir’s book is a splendid exercise in poststructuralism.5
Their starting point is Foucauldian: two dominant discourses on the
event of the occupation are deconstructed in the book; the first concerns
the occupation’s temporariness (a temporal discourse), and the second,
externality (a spatial discourse). The temporal discourse dressed up the
occupation with a temporality that became indefinite by promoting a
sense of imminent resolution, based on talk about ‘peace for territories’.
This linguistic space allowed for a professed Zionist readiness to discuss
the terms of ending the occupation, while in fact standing in for, or
perpetually deferring, any actual discussion about that ending. At the
same time, the spatial discourse succeeded in placing the occupation
outside the daily lives of most Israelis – as a distant space, physically
and mentally, making it possible to bracket the territories away from
the Israeli collective consciousness (Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 27). As
Gordon points out, ‘The overall objective was to weaken internal
resistance to the Occupation, and since rhetoric does not always have
to avoid contradiction, the Occupation was presented as simultaneously
temporary, moral, and nonexistent’ (Gordon 2008: 7). The main point
Gordon stresses here is that in the discourse of the Occupation, it
became a temporary project and simultaneously exterior to the State
of Israel.
The intersection of the respective discourses of temporariness and
externality is what gives the occupation the discursive force that has
preserved it as a ‘normal’ or ‘invisible’ form of living (Gordon 2008:
49). These discourses explain how the impact of the occupation on
the production of Israeli cultural, political and social life is minimised
or eliminated. For instance, we find no reference to the occupation as
such, as a system of colonial occupation, in the increasingly militarised
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educational system (where it is explained as a space being negotiated for
the sake of all involved);6 in the perennial debates over the condition of
Israel’s ‘democracy’ (in which the occupation is presented as an ongoing
test of a still-vibrant democracy, rather than its antithesis); in the
discourse regarding peace and national security (where the occupation
is presented as a ‘necessary evil’, for which the Palestinians themselves
are responsible); or in discussions in which ethnic segregation (which has
deepened since the occupation began) is presented as both justified and
as a self-evident necessity.
These two suspensions have given the occupation project both life and
legitimacy: if it is ‘outside’ Israel proper, then it does not reflect on Israel
as a whole; and if it is temporary it is tolerable. This is the consensus
that Azoulay and Ophir tackle in their book and which has resulted
in two interlinked and appalling actualisations: the various modalities
of oppression of the Palestinians across the Green Line, and Israeli
normalcy. To examine this unfortunate situation critically, we must go
beyond the limits imposed by the occupation’s discourses and modes of
thinking, modes of dominance, and general productions.
In terms of the operational political regimes involved, the status
quo in the land between the Mediterranean and the River Jordan is
as follows: within the Green Line – ‘Israel proper’ – there is a sovereign
system operating along the lines of a sophisticated ethnocracy (Yiftachel
2006), which skilfully manipulates democratic tools and techniques
to its own ends; the areas beyond the Green Line – the Palestinian
territories held since 1967 – are subject to an oppressive colonial-military
regime. The stark contrast between these two entities underscores the
‘outside-ness’ of the occupation and is related, according to Azoulay
and Ophir, to two fundamental classifications which are also in play:
first, a territorial division between the area within the Green Line and
the occupied Palestinian space beyond; second, a division between two
discrete systems of subordination: of citizens on the one hand (Jews
and non-Jews – the latter being mainly Palestinian), and non-citizens
(Palestinians) on the other. These distinctions, however, are merely plain
and unadorned statements of empirical fact, and do not attest to the
qualitative properties of the systems of domination. In fact, if this was
all there was to the matter, they would point to a simple congruence of
the ‘territorial’ and ‘subordinate’ classifications, rendering the detaching
of the territories from Israel proper a redundant exercise. However, this
is not the case.
The two classifications are not congruent because matters such as
land, people, apparatuses of control and the market economy, do not
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form separate planes of production divided neatly along the Green
Line – contrary to the claims made by promoters of the so-called
‘Security Barrier’ (the Wall), now running through the West Bank, and
of the barbed-wire fence along Gaza. Rather, Azoulay and Ophir’s
main argument should be read as follows: the occupation project has
evolved in the Sea-to-River region as a dynamic system of domination,
in which intertwining libidinal flows – of authority, of people, of material
things, of cultural ideas, and of economic investments – run in both
directions, from Israel proper into the Palestinian territories and vice
versa. Particular forms of domination – of the Palestinians – arise from
this organisation. As a result, trying to examine the two regions as two
separate and unconnected entities is akin to dismembering a body and
studying each part in isolation, in a bid to understand the function and
properties of the anatomy as a whole. No interpretation could be more
mechanical or more empirically wrong about Israel/Palestine.
By contrast, what emerges from a holistic examination of the Seato-River space, beyond the formal and tangible political systems, is
the overall body that we do not normally see – the structure – which
has no official existence as a recognised political entity, but which
nevertheless impacts in a very real way on its subjects, given the
reciprocal workings between its two constituent parts. The Sea-toRiver regime is a manifestation of the order of the structure – a third
order, defined by Deleuze as the symbolic (Deleuze 2004: 171–3). For
Deleuze, the symbolic realm is the outcome of choices, selections and
omissions of particular relations – ‘a process where the symbol implies
a rearrangement of relations in structures’ (Williams 2005: 58). In this
instance, the rearrangement occurs in the organising body of relations
and connections emerging from the ways in which the occupation has
evolved since 1967. This body is the latest stage of evolution of the
historical encounter between Zionist immigrants-settlers and the native
Palestinian people at the end of the nineteenth century, and provides
the structural conditions for the real for Israelis and Palestinians. As a
structure, it ‘is defined as a necessary condition for the transformation
of the thing’ (54). By understanding this structure as a source of
becomings for Israelis and Palestinians, we might ‘read’ more correctly
how this body evolves and may be transformed. To put it another
way, this understanding converts the conditions of impossibility into the
conditions of possibility. In practical terms, it frees us from the limited
and fanciful view that the occupation and its wider repercussions may
be easily undone by a peace accord following a political resolution – as
well as from the consensual model of the ‘two states’ solution. One
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way to pose the question raised by Azoulay and Ophir might be: can
Israeli citizenship, cultural habits and governmentalities be regarded
in detachment from the systems of control of the West Bank and
Gaza? From the point of view of the ‘structure’, the answer must
be no.

III. A Regime of Fluxes
From the outset of the occupation in June 1967, Israeli domination has
been applied concurrently but differentially to territories and subjects,
‘making a clear distinction between the land it had occupied and the
people who inhabited it’ (Gordon 2008: 6). What has evolved is a system
of ‘confiscation without integration’ involving
a series of mechanisms . . . thus developed to expropriate the occupied land
without fully annexing it, while numerous apparatuses and practices were
introduced to regulate and manage the lives of the Palestinians without
integrating them into Israeli society. (Gordon 2008: 6)7

This distinction, however, is incidental to the more fundamental
principle of the territorial distinction, as we said, between the occupied
land and Israel proper (Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 46). On the one hand,
a complex legal patchwork system for governing the Palestinians has
been repeatedly amended, incorporating elements of ‘Ottoman, British
Mandatory (particularly the emergency regulations of 1945), Jordanian
and Egyptian law (depending on the region), and Israeli military orders’
(Gordon 2008: 27). At the same time, the Israeli colonies8 and settlers
on the West Bank and Gaza have always been subject to Israeli law
as if they resided within the Green Line (8). In other words, settlers,
soldiers and other Israelis within the Palestinian territories have been
‘extra-territorialised’ and invested with ‘personal jurisdiction’, carrying
the Israeli law on their person, as it were, within the territories, thereby
expanding the functions and spaces of action of Israeli law. This
embodiment of the law, in the most literal sense, has turned movement
into a unit of analysis and of biopolitical application.9 In other words, to
the question of whose body it is, these expansions have added the spatial
question of ‘where’.
Moreover, the occupation is ‘re-imported’ on a daily basis into
Israel proper through those self-same bodies (settlers, IDF soldiers
and officers, clerks, private companies’ employees, and – ironically – also
left-wing activists ‘visiting’ the territories for purposes of protest and
support) – who by their very presence and the roles they play reiterate the
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‘doubled’ or expanded nature of the Israeli regime. As Gordon describes
it:
Settlers are constantly travelling both within the OT [occupied territories] and
to Israel, commuting to work, taking children to school, going shopping, and
visiting friends. While these private trips are no doubt part of the settler’s
daily routine, simply by travelling within the OT the settlers fulfil several
functions. (Gordon 2008: 139)

To manage the Palestinian territories – complementing the military
administration which acts as the executive branch – Israel deployed
various formal administrative ministerial committees made up of
senior officials from government ministries, and – since 1981 – the Civil
Administration, which was appointed as the governing body for all civil
affairs (Gordon 2008: 30). On the economic front, the relationship that
has arisen between Israel proper and the Palestinians has been ‘marked
by a series of constraints and restrictions that hindered the development
of an independent Palestinian economy’ (70) – the better to promote
Israel’s needs and interests. One hallmark of this interdependence is
the securing of the Palestinian territories as a captive market for Israeli
goods (Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 97; Gordon 2008: 70–5). Although
the occupation ‘opened up’ new labour opportunities for Palestinians
from the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza (mainly in services),
the dependency it engendered proved to be a double-edged sword,
as it enabled Israeli employers – with the state’s blessing – to exploit
Palestinian workers as cheap labour, which in turn helped trigger the
swift growth in the Israeli economy following the 1967 war (Gordon
2008: 66).
As Gordon explains, Israel has implemented various modes of
economic power to manage the Palestinian population and economy: in
the first decades for example, Israel used ‘pastoral power’ to promote a
certain degree of Palestinian prosperity to discourage organised national
resistance (Gordon 2008: 62–9): ‘in exchange for their partial economic
incorporation, the Palestinians had to contain their political desires’ (82).
But management here should not be understood in terms of Foucauldian
confinement; rather, domination was based through the monitoring of
moving bodies: a continuous control of Palestinians within the whole
geography of the Israeli regime (cf. Deleuze 1995: 174–5). This is how,
slowly, open fields, roads, streets, homes and workplaces – on both sides
of the Green Line – became a multiplicity of sites of control.
The territories’ colonial dependency has been compounded by the
way Israel has expropriated Palestinian land (for colonies, military
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bases, security, and roads infrastructure) and natural resources (mainly
water), at the expense of Palestinian farmers (Gordon 2008: 127–8).
It has also had disastrous consequences for the prospects of economic
prosperity and a sound economy developing in the West Bank and
Gaza. From the time of the first intifada – and, more acutely, since the
second one – Israel has placed severe restrictions on the movement of
Palestinian goods and workers (33–40; 185),10 reducing the Palestinian
economy to a precarious state of affairs and the Palestinians themselves
to destitution.11 The occupation became not only a means for the IDF
to stimulate the Israeli economy, but for the colonies and the military
regime to become targets of economic investment by Israeli private
companies seeking to profit from servicing the settlers and the IDF
system of control (electricity, communication, construction, and so on).
All in all, as Gordon describes,
At a certain point the distinction between government expenditures within
Israel proper and expenditures in the OT was expunged from the annual
budget, in effect transforming the entire area from the Jordan Valley to the
Mediterranean Sea into one economic unit. (Gordon 2008: 8; see also 63)

The incorporation of the territories into the Israeli economy has
ultimately led to their annexation in all but name. This includes
controlling Palestinian imports and exports (in contravention of the
‘Paris Accord Custom Union’ of 1994);12 skewing competition with
Israeli products to ensure that the Palestinians are a captive market;
imposing restrictions on Palestinian business and industry development
to favour Israeli companies, who benefit from tax relief and the
protection of the law for their exploitation of Palestinian workers;
worsening restrictions on movement of Palestinian goods and labour
through a complex regime of permits, and so on. No one today can
imagine the Israeli economy without the territories.13
This state of affairs did not change substantially as a result of the
Oslo process (which began in 1993) and the resulting Accords. Indeed,
as Gordon maintains, these should in reality be seen as the ‘outsourcing
of the Occupation’ (see Gordon 2008: 169–96), since they reorganised
power by making the Palestinian Authority a proxy of the occupation
regime. Although the establishment of the Palestinian Authority created
a semblance of sovereignty (see Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 167–72), in
fact, for the Palestinians themselves it has doubled the burden on a
personal level: the Israeli occupation has given up nothing of its general
spatial dominance, while ushering in a new regime of controlled human
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movement, and slicing the territories into hundreds of separate enclaves
and Jews-only spheres of movement.
In addition, land colonisation did not cease but was transformed in
inventive new ways (for example, through more land appropriations
for Jews-only roads and separation artefacts, and through what Israel
ingeniously refers to as ‘illegal outposts’, which in reality extend the
colonial fabric while portraying the illusion of a rule of law befitting
a democratic state).14 In fact, the only area where the Israeli regime
has truly abdicated its responsibility is in relation to the civil welfare
of Palestinians, which it has handed over to the Palestinian Authority
while simultaneously undermining the latter’s ability to provide welfare
and manage the population (Gordon 2008: 192). In the final analysis,
the Palestinians have found themselves facing two kinds of Israeli
control – direct and indirect – depending on the type of territory they
live in.15 In effect, it might be said that Oslo silently ‘killed off’ the
first intifada, while contributing a great deal to the normalisation of
the occupation (182). This description of the various ways and means
of oppressing the Palestinians in the territories shows ‘that suspension
of law and the forsaking of life do not completely overlap’ (Ophir
et al. 2009: 23): to deny citizenship and rights, Israel implemented
power-regimes that activate law in different forms (‘a tapestry of
regulations, procedures, and decrees’), making clear that abandonment
is not necessarily produced by scarcity of care (letting die), but
rather the opposite, through active action. This is how irresponsibility,
abandonment and perfection are held together. Azoulay and Ophir’s
critique of Agamben on this point is clear:
The abuse of life at the hands of the ruling power is not due to some
withdrawal of the law, but occurs thanks to a savage proliferation of legalities
and illegalities and the creation of an extensive judicial patchwork that
has no lawfulness of its own and that keeps changing the law itself, the
regime’s authorities and immunity, and the subject’s own status before the
law. (Azoulay and Ophir 2009: 114)

For Israelis, if anything clear-cut has emerged from the Oslo Accords,
it is that they have bestowed legitimacy on the time-honoured notion of
separation and partition not only as the logic by which space must be
governed, but as the moral and political horizon to aspire to.
All in all, the project of occupation has created mutually supportive
metastases (Israel proper and the territories), born as such due to
the continual movement of material, human, legal, political, economic
and cultural fluxes between them. In addition to these two spatial
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paths of fluxes, there are innumerable other, related, fluxes, such
as those determining the type of relationships between the State of
Israel and its Palestinian citizenry, and fluxes forging connections
beyond the territorial space of the ‘Sea-to-River’ regime (for example,
internationally supported forms of resistance). All these fluxes are
instances – particular (here-and-now) actualised sub-structures – of an
unconscious structure: at this point I suggest that the structure
explaining the functioning of the Zionist–Palestinian system or the
‘one’ Israeli regime in the Sea-to-River region corresponds to, following
Agamben, a structure of abandonment (Agamben 1998: 2005).16
In ‘How Do We Recognize Structuralism?’, Deleuze states that
every structure is a virtual multiplicity of serial coexistence, consisting
of elements held by differential relations that continue into the
determination ‘of singular points that constitute a space corresponding
to these elements’ (Deleuze 2004: 176–7, 179–80, 182). Many series
are involved in the production of this structure of abandonment: from
the previous description of fluxes alone we can attest to the coexistence
of politico-juridical, biological, economic and territorial series. The
elements of the politico-juridical series, for example, include the rule
of law, political rights, political subjects and political spaces (the camp
and the public realm). The interrelations of these elements, and the
differential relations between this series and the others, ‘determine the
nature of the beings and objects which come to realize them’ (177). In the
capitalist mode of production, for instance, exploitation and alienation
are explained by the historical differential relations of property and
appropriation holding between the symbolic elements of the labour
force, the worker, nature, money and the segregated space of production
(178). We will now go on to ask how the differential relations between
the series of the Zionist–Palestinian system create values and attitudes
(effects) that confer a relation of abandonment upon the structure.
This means we must ‘account for the very particular presence of
[the] structure in its effects, and for the way in which it differenciates
these effects, at the same time as these latter assimilate and integrate it’
(Deleuze 2004: 181) – in our case, then, we must retrieve the structure of
abandonment (of Palestinians) of the ‘Sea-to-River’ regime by analysing
its effects in terms of the actual impact upon life within those boundaries.
Indeed, a structure not only ‘lives’ in the virtual, but in accordance
with the logic of reciprocal causality ‘also differentiates the species and
parts, the beings and functions in which the structure is actualized’
(180). The virtual multiplicity constituting the structure of the ‘one’
regime is embodied throughout the matrix of fluxes running across the
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Green Line, ‘according to exclusive rules, always implicating partial
combinations and unconscious choices’ (179). These fluxes carry and
distribute parts and objects – such as the contested land, the soldier, the
Palestinian farmer, the settler, the Jewish-citizen, the Palestinian citizen,
the Palestinian worker, the economic relations, the colonies, the forms
of authority and dominance, the forms of resistance, and so on – which
actualise differential relations between the series by arranging themselves
differently within each flow, forging different roles and functions and
ultimately manifesting certain subjectivities.
From the point of view of the two metastases, the main conclusion
is that since 1967, the occupation has broadened Israel’s range of
governmentability beyond the Green Line, and that the Line itself has
since become a differentially permeable membrane through which a
new political regime has developed. What is taking place is a dual
dynamic of accentuation and erasure of the Green Line. On the one
hand, the way in which the educational system within Israel proper
has portrayed the occupation as a complete outside, the economic
integration, the ‘extension’ of Israeli law embodied within the settlers
and the colonies themselves, the colonisation of Palestinian land, labour
and water – these have all but erased every vestige of the Green Line
as a traditional frontier. On the other hand, the separation wall, the
‘menial jobs without benefits and security’ (Gordon 2008: 89), the
regime of permits, closures, curfews and other instruments installed to
control Palestinians’ movements and to confine them, and the Palestinian
resistance – all underscore the continuing existence of the Line. The
changing location (always moving checkpoints for example) and varying
porosity (changing the permit regime to allow passage according to age,
profession, hours and so on) of the membrane striates the space of the ‘in
between’ structurally, but not specifically – terrorising the entire passagezone.
The endless traffic between the two parts of the regime attests to the
‘extensions’ produced by each flow. This perspective is revealing of the
nature of this particular form of military occupation: it has evolved not
only as a profusion of systems of control, surveillance and resistance, but
also as a host of systems of mutual absorption between the territories
and Israel proper.17 The respective extensions of the two sub-structures
together form a particular kind of connection. We have seen how they
are joined together by the fluxes that render them interdependent; it
is, however, a relation normalised by depicting the occupation as an
‘outside’ that should be disregarded. For most Israeli Jews, ‘the part
[i.e., the occupation regime] of the whole [the regime between Sea and
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River] is grasped as extrinsic to the whole, and this is exactly how it is
included’ (Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 390). ‘Most Israelis do not know
the other part of the moon’, as Azoulay and Ophir explain, yet it is
nevertheless one and the same moon. This is how ‘normalcy’ has been
incrementally established since 1967: upon a productive plane (political,
legal and economic) which has fused together the Sea-to-River space in
a particular manner, while at the same time presenting the occupation
as something divorced from everyday life in Israel.
Azoulay and Ophir dub this situation inclusion through separation,
or inclusive separation; more recently Ophir et al. (2009) have named it
inclusive exclusion – that is to say, what is separated is retained, because
otherwise:
If the separation is completed, the project will come to an end and the regime
will collapse, leaving just the two entities that constitute it . . . [conversely]
if the separation is terminated, the regime will also collapse, since the two
entities that constitute it will merge into one. (Azoulay and Ophir 2008:
391)

This is how ‘placing the territories on the outside in fact amounts
to their incorporation within the State of Israel’ (Azoulay and Ophir
2008: 26). The logic of ‘inclusive exclusion’, therefore, is what prevents
the structure from slipping either into complete annexation or into
complete withdrawal (187). It is this suspended state that explains
the productive aspect of the regime and its changes over time. The
production is the result of a continuing struggle between two kinds of
forces – one generating separation, while the other enhances the degree of
involvement and contact between the two parts of the regime (190–2).
‘The regime of the Israeli state is therefore the structure formed from
the particular amalgamation of two different regimes under one roof’
(330) – hence the label, ‘two that are one’. In other words, there is no
such thing as an Israeli or a Palestinian socius as a separate entity – there
is only a common Israeli/Palestinian socius.
In this way, the occupation regime has transformed the government
of Israel into the ‘Sea-to-River’ government, and – more crucially – its
citizenry into an electorate for that government. ‘The Israelis are also
part of this regime as citizens – not only because for over forty years
they have voted in ‘free and democratic elections’ for governments that
persist in expanding and cultivating the system of domination in the
territories’, but mainly because their civic habitus became an instrument
of the occupation (Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 400).
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IV. The Empty Square of the Occupation
It follows that Israel cannot be contemplated on its own – nor can
the system of occupation. Nevertheless, there is no formal structure
between the Sea and the River in the shape of a unified regime, but
rather a series of hybrid, disjunctive syntheses of fluxes. The dynamic of
‘inclusive separation’ suggests that ‘the structure contains a paradoxical
object’ (Deleuze 2004: 184) – something that signals that the project
is unfinished and lacks a clear and final identity, something that ‘has
become a permanent feature of the occupation regime and of the
apparatus linking the two regimes’ (Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 395).
This object leaves behind the real as something unresolved, in a state of
dynamism and discomfort. Something clearly connects the two regimes,
and runs through them, displacing elements and generating properties in
its path. This object, the paradoxical object of the structure, is the empty
square: it does not remain in a fixed position, but is constantly moving;
nor is it occupied continuously by the same element – thereby preventing
the formation of an identity based on elements. It neither belongs to,
nor is fixed by, either series, but is present in all of them dynamically.
Its content can never be fully identified and, according to Deleuze, it
prevents our minds from merging series together. In the case at hand, it
has indeed been successful: although by rights we ought to, we tend not
to think of the regime lying between the Mediterranean and the River
Jordan as a single entity.
Is it possible for us to ‘identify’ the element maintaining the dynamism
of the structure – the empty square of the occupation? What is it that
ceaselessly slices through the series, crossing them and yet still capable
of depicting their communication? What is this object that has enabled
the regime’s effective doubling in size, and its syntheses?
To answer this question, I shall examine the way the symbolic series
are manifest through the fluxes running between the two metastases.
Firstly, I adopt Azoulay and Ophir’s distinction between ‘the governed
condition’ – that is, the formal-legal relationship of the subject to
the state, and ‘participation’ – namely, how hegemony and political
dominance are constructed, and by whom (Azoulay and Ophir 2008:
379–81). Both dimensions highlight Agamben’s structure of exception
in politics. Citizens and non-citizens are ruled or governed differently,
while the dimension of participation is absent in non-citizens but
differentiates – in Israel – along ethno-national lines. Within the territories, citizenship eclipses ethno-national differences, since it is the
Palestinians’ non-citizen status that defines their ‘governed condition’
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and establishes the distinction and relevance of the sphere of citizenship.
Within Israel proper, the ethno-national categorisation relies upon
citizenship differences in ‘participation’ – a practice that is the raison
d’être of the Jewish state.
Secondly, on the ‘game-table’ of the occupation, the shape of the
empty square is governed by the combination or interdependence of
‘the governed condition’ and ‘participation’. It is present in the fluxes
running to and fro between the two regimes, and has varying values
at different coordinates of time and space. The initial distribution at
the start of the occupation in 1967 was the starting point. At that
time, the Palestinian citizens of Israel were only a year into the new
regime that followed the revocation of the military government they
had lived under since 1948. So while Palestinian subjects within Israel
proper were passing from meticulous control by the state to a more mild
biopolitical subjectivation (Lustick 1980; Ghanem 2001), Palestinians
in the newly occupied territories were about to become a subject
of disciplinary power (Gordon 2008: 23–47): different ‘rulings’, and
different ‘participations’ – for a divided people by one regime.
But as the occupation evolved, and fluxes started crossing it back
and forth, elements began changing places in the series, producing a
navigable border which in effect doubled the scope of the Israeli regime.
The empty square communicates between the series by communicating
between the flows running from Israel proper into the territories and
back again, and its singularity resides in what it enables us to think – the
transformations and becomings occurring throughout the series within
the actual order of things. Thanks to the empty square, the series
reverberate off each other (Gil 2008: 410) in a communication based
on their intersections as streams of differences (not as identical items of
a species), which in fact is the principle of emission of singularities, or of
events (Deleuze 1990: 51). This works as follows:
Once communication between heterogeneous series is established, all sorts
of consequences follow within the system. Something ‘passes’ between the
borders, events explode, phenomena flash, like thunder and lightning. Spatiotemporal dynamisms fill the system, expressing simultaneously the resonance
of the coupled series and the amplitude of the forced movement which exceeds
them. (Deleuze 1994: 118)

The relations between the series cause the two parts of the regime
to make contact and merge, synthesising subjects and objects into a
single body by displacing the system of subordination (of citizens and
non-citizens) from matching the territorial distinction (between the two
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sub-structures), thus generating a productive tension – or the ‘problem’
of the occupation. However, although this displacement defines the
problem, it does not determine it fully, attempting as it does both to
approach and to separate. In this context, we must remember that
‘problems are defined by the way structures do not fit together and yet
have internal drives to achieve that fit’ (Williams 2005: 64).
While keeping in mind that power applies itself ubiquitously, shaping
bodies and subjects everywhere and not only at one of its ‘ends’,18
we might follow Gordon’s example and argue that the communication
between the series since 1967 has been constantly changing and
expressing the transformations in the ‘modes of power’ and ‘modes of
resistance’ between Israel and the Palestinians. ‘During the occupation’s
first years’, explains Gordon, ‘Israel emphasised disciplinary power
and bio-power. . . ’ while during the last years, and especially since the
second intifada, Israel plays ‘the more traditional mode of sovereign
power – shifting from a politics of life to a politics of death’ (Gordon
2008: 11–13; 115; 206–8). This ‘shifting emphasis on one mode
of power rather than another . . . [and] the interactions, excesses,
and contradictions within and among the controlling practices and
apparatuses . . . and Palestinian resistance’ explains the ‘changing nature
of the occupation’ (15).19 For example, ‘with the adoption of the
separation principle’ following the Oslo Accords and the modes of
power implemented in response to the second intifada, the nature of
the Green Line changed from a comparatively ‘open membrane’ to
a border that is ‘normally closed’ to Palestinians, ‘transforming the
OT into a container of sorts’ (212; 180).20 On the other hand, since
1966 Palestinians in Israel proper have been increasingly challenging
the promises of Israeli democracy by levering the discourse of rights
and, lately, of multiculturalism for the sake of creating a more inclusive
regime (Smooha 1990, 1997; Adalah 2007).
The relationship to the law (by way of another example) also changed
regarding the territories: until September 2000 Israel controlled the
occupied inhabitants primarily through the application of draconian
laws (including the legalisation of incarceration of political prisoners,
of deportations, house demolitions, torture, extended curfews and other
forms of collective punishment), but, according to Gordon, the period
since the second intifada has been characterised by a more violent
abandonment of the Palestinians (Gordon 2008: 205). Uncertainty is
assured by making it impossible for those in the territories to internalise
the law, as Azoulay and Ophir explain: ‘What the Palestinian learns in
an encounter with the regime in one venue . . . does not teach him or her
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what to expect in other encounters in other venues’ (Azoulay and Ophir
2009: 115). Although we would like to move through a less arborescent
model of the law, it seems that this somehow rhizomatic character does
not enhance life. Here, once more, we have another striking example
of how the IDF implement Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual tools. In
parallel, as we shall see in the next section, a new assertive approach to
laws having a direct impact on Palestinians in Israel proper (in terms of
land, housing and loyalty to the state) has been adopted lately, marking
a departure from the former policy of hidden discrimination.
The mechanisms for discipline and control of the Palestinians across
the Green Line are integrated into a single plane of production of
oppression, but operating from different strata, and through different
assemblages, so as to shape different but connected subjects. As we
can see from the examples, the pairing of ‘the governed condition’ and
‘participation’ is based on the kind of conditions Deleuze set for the
empty square: when appearing in one place as an excess, it is manifested
elsewhere as an absence (Deleuze 1990: 51). This enables the series to
communicate in terms of reciprocal determination, and to flow as two
branches of the same structure. The empty square is the element that
attests to the historical sets of selections, omissions and syntheses in
the actual – the symbolic element of the structure, the infrastructure.
It is the event of the occupation that leaves its mark upon the series,
changing them and their relations of sense, thereby ‘making sense’ of the
problematic nature of Western democracy.

V. A Triangle of Subjectivities
In examining this developing state of affairs, Azoulay and Ophir are
right to claim that ‘the domination of the occupied territories is the
context in which the government has acted since 1967, and whose
constraints have governed its handling of outlying issues’ (Azoulay
and Ophir 2008: 26; original emphasis). The domination of the
territories rapidly changed from yet another national task in 1967
into a project that became ‘the fundamental matrix through which
the government operates’ (Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 26). As a result,
it was not only the international community that started to view
Israel through the occupation, but the regime itself embraced that
outlook as well. At some point since the occupation began, four
forces merged together, with irreversible consequences for the Israeli
political and social regime, namely: unwillingness to incorporate the
occupied Palestinians; persevering on the distinction Israel made between

The Empty Square of the Occupation 403
Palestinian inhabitants and Palestinian land; the emergence of the
criterion of citizenship to differentiate between occupied Palestinians and
the Palestinians within Israel proper; and the devastating force of the
ethno-national logic inside Israel proper. The syntheses between these
forces crystallised the differences between occupied people and citizens,
and created a relation of conceptual and practical interdependence
between the three significant subjectivities emerging in the Sea and
River space: on the one hand, the Palestinian subject – the non-citizen
and pariah of the regime (exploited worker and oppressed political
subject); his antithesis – the Jewish-Israeli citizen (Azoulay and Ophir
2008: 109); and lastly, the Palestinian citizen within Israel (living
under a relationship of ethnically alibied abandonment). This triangle
of subjectivities (conceptual rather than geometrical) embodies the
empty square that actualises ‘the governed condition–participation’
pair, enabled by a twofold harnessing of the non-citizen status of the
occupied Palestinians and the handicapped citizenship of those inside
Israel. This connection points to what appears to be the most significant
change introduced by the system of occupation in the Zionist–Palestinian
structure since the assembling of the Zionist collective desire to ‘cleanse’
Palestine at the start of the national project in the early years of the
twentieth century (Svirsky 2010), and the brutal widespread cleansing
of the land in 1948–9 (Pappe 2006). Specifically, this change means that
denying citizenship to the Palestinians in the territories reinforces ethnic
restrictions within Israel; to put it more bluntly, the former became the
logic of the latter. Viewed from the other side, we might say that for the
regime – and for most Jewish Israelis – thinking about the prospects for
the role the Palestinians citizens should play is almost never detached
from the fact that the Palestinian territories are being occupied. The
resonance between the Israeli public’s acceptance of and acquiescence
in the occupation on the one hand, and with the devalued character
of the citizenship held by Palestinians within Israel on the other, is
a consequence of the ‘ethnic sounding-board’ reverberating between
the Sea and the River, and evident in all walks of life – be they legal,
geopolitical, educational, social or cultural.
A few examples might illustrate the range and depth of this
phenomenon. For many years, one of the state-controlled radio stations
has broadcast a 15-minute programme called ‘Friends and Family – Lost
and Found’ five times a week. People phone in to ask for help
in finding friends and relatives with whom they have lost touch.
Like many other shows on Israeli radio and television, the intended
audience might be Hebrew or Arabic native speakers – or so one would
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assume – but in reality the programme is broadcast in collaboration with
the Jewish Agency and the Central Zionist Archive, and serves as a
means for seeking out Jews who went missing during the Holocaust
or its aftermath, or with whom contact was lost during one of
the waves of immigration to Israel. No one in his right mind – Jew
or Palestinian – would imagine a Palestinian citizen phoning in for
information on his or her relative lost during the Nakba.21
Nowhere is this ‘ethnic normalcy’ more plainly evident than
in housing policy, particularly when it comes to rural housing.
Under the notorious ‘Judaisation of the Galilee project’ (launched in
the early 1970s), many small and expressly Jews-only communities
were established in Israel’s northern region in a blatant attempt at
demographic engineering (Yiftachel 1993, 1999, 2006). Following riots
in the region in October 2000 – in which 12 Palestinian citizens were
killed by the police – and in the face of threats by Jewish local authorities,
the Israeli Ministry of Defence allocated funds ‘to increase security’,
which meant enclosing the Galilean Jewish communities behind iron
fences and electrically operated gates. This kind of physical landscape
is reminiscent of that of the Jewish settlements in the territories – thereby
further diminishing the significance of the Green Line and highlighting
the occupation’s expansion into the ethnic project taking place within
Israel proper (Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 421).
To enshrine in law the existing ongoing exclusion of Palestinian
families from these bourgeois rural communities, the Knesset has
lately initiated legislation on the subject, echoing the internal codes of
admission set by ‘acceptance committees’ established by the communities
themselves.
In contrast to the old manner of concealed discrimination (which
implied a measure of discomfiture), this time ethnic segregation is being
overtly stratified (and justified) in a manner similar to the practice in the
territories. The occupation has infiltrated and shaped action, thinking
and subjectivities22 in other areas as well. This is clearly demonstrated
in the amendment to the Law of Citizenship of 2003, ratified four years
later by the Supreme Court.23 Although passed as a temporary provision,
it has been re-enacted every year since then (echoing the discourse of
temporariness used to perpetuate the occupation). According to this
amendment, the right of equality in starting a family is seriously curbed
for Palestinian Israeli citizens. On the pretext of ‘security’, it precludes a
Palestinian Israeli citizen from applying for citizenship for their spouse
if the latter is a (Palestinian) resident of the territories. Consequently, if
a family wishes to stay together in such marriages, its only option is to
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move to the territories, or abroad. Such is the plane produced for them
by the occupation and Israel proper.
Increasingly, the sound of abandonment reverberates and connects
Palestinians across the Green Line: although separated by the criterion
of citizenship, this is what governs the relationship between the two
populations of Palestinians, between their hobbled citizenship within
Israel proper, and their managed abandonment within the territories.
It is no wonder, then, that the emergence of a civic-democratic habitus
in Israel lies far beyond actual conditions. The Israeli regime of
citizenship/non-citizenship is a blunt example of how abandonment is
exercised as a defining feature of contemporary politics – a toxin with no
antidote. In the case of the Palestinian citizens of Israel, the ethnic barrier
is what prevents them from becoming full and equal citizens, and it is
structurally underpinned by another form of abandonment, namely, the
non-citizen status of the Palestinians in the territories. In other words,
given the latter exception, the former becomes logical and plausible: for
the Palestinians in Israel proper, the realistic alternative to their situation
is not full integration and egalitarianism, familiarity and proximity
to the regime, but rather non-citizenship. Thus, the occupation must
be understood not simply in terms of the radicalisation and endless
restrictions placed upon the Palestinian citizens of Israel, but as the total
alienation of occupied Palestinians so that the ethnic-based exclusion of
the Palestinian citizens within Israel proper may be more easily ignored,
managed and justified (Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 386). In this way, the
realms of citizenship and non-citizenship are bound together, inasmuch
as one defines the other, and the argument that the Israeli regime and
citizenship cannot be understood without reference to 40 years of Israeli
occupation becomes evident.

VI. Epilogue
In fact, Israeli democracy should be seen as the expressed form of
the event that is the occupation; democratic life in Israel proper takes
place amidst the exploitation and the total exclusion of the Palestinians
from the territories (Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 431). To put it another
way: ‘the regime of the Occupation is an extreme instance of a known
structural property of democratic regimes: the existence of a significant
backyard of a ruled population that takes no part in the shared
administration of public life’ (Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 446).
The notion of ‘democracy’s backyard’ is a clear echo of Agamben’s
structure of exception, and yields a fruitful discussion of what needs to
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be transformed. The backyard may be democracy’s hell, but it is also
that which defines the democracy. Abandonment and exploitation are
a given in this space. In the case of the Israeli regime, it refers both
to the regime’s split nature (it is not inclusive and yet universal) and
to its physical boundaries (from Sea to River). It is embodied in the
differences in how the various communities in that space are ruled – the
aforementioned empty square, or pairing of ‘the governed condition’
and ‘participation’. In the region bounded by the Mediterranean and the
River Jordan, this square, ‘the backyard’, moves and takes on varying
shapes and contents. The territories function as the regime’s significant
backyard, but at the same they are also the immediate backyard of the
Israeli colonies. Additional backyards exist within Israel proper. The
linking between the various backyards is what absolves the regime of
responsibility for the harm done to the people populating them. By this
method, the regime succeeds not only in putting the backyards out of
mind, but in laying responsibility for them elsewhere.
Azoulay and Ophir’s contribution to this discussion is to highlight
how the exclusion of Palestinian citizens within Israel proper is seen as
a fault that need not be remedied – or in other words, ‘the alienation of
the occupation as a regime is the flip side of the alienation of the nonJewish citizens in Israel proper’ (Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 442). At the
same time, the reciprocal relationship between distance and proximity,
and between citizenship and non-citizenship, in the Sea-to-River region,
accentuates their contrasts, providing yet another significant sign left to
us by the event of the occupation.
In light of all the above, it would be wrong to think of ‘internal’
changes within Israel proper – such as the notion of equal rights for
Palestinian Israeli citizens – as taking place independently of events
in the territories. The ‘internal’ must be seen as extending from
the Mediterranean Sea to the River Jordan, given Israel’s success in
establishing ‘dominance over the Palestinian non-citizens as a selfevident feature of the Israeli regime’ (Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 430).
If the empty square of the occupation represents the boundaries of
the structure, then only by introducing new differences within these
boundaries can the structure be changed. Any substantive change in
the structure of the Israeli regime must involve new deterritorialisations
of the dyad ‘the governed condition’ and ‘participation’, whereby the
struggle is taken up by all individuals in that jurisdiction, in a bid to
change the form, the limits and the content of the regime in the area
under Israeli control.24
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Notes
1. As a result of the war, Israel also conquered East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights
and the Sinai Peninsula (see note 2).
2. The term refers to the 1949 armistice lines agreed between Israel and Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria following the 1948 war (known in Israel as the ‘War
of Independence’). The Green Line refers to the border separating Israel from
the territories of West Bank, Gaza, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights,
before they were captured during the Six Day War of 1967. The Sinai Peninsula
was returned to Egypt as part of the peace agreement reached in 1979. In 1981
Israel officially annexed the Syrian Golan Heights.
3. Handel explains that the Palestinian creates his physical and spatial resistance
by forbidding himself ‘to take paths generally considered accessible or even
obligatory’ (creating shortcuts and detours to avoid checkpoints for example)
(Handel 2009: 215).
4. At the start of the 1980s Meron Benvenisti was the first to diagnose the system
of control over the territories as fundamental to the Israeli regime, and pointed
to the irreversibility of these changes (see www.matzpen.org).
5. Azoulay and Ophir disassociate their study from the critical tradition that sees
Zionism as a colonising fabric, arguing that the occupation is not the inevitable
product of a long colonial history (Azoulay and Ophir 2008: 22). Although
they are right to refuse to reduce their analysis to assigning the given (the
occupation) to existing given categories (Zionist colonialism), and to insist
on forging new concepts for evaluating the given – by uncoupling their study
from the historical storyline of Zionist colonialism, I believe that they withhold
important layers of understanding. The genealogy of Zionist colonialism – to
which we have access thanks to pioneering studies by the likes of Shafir (1989),
Smith (1993) and Pappe (1999, 2004, 2006) – teaches us about the cultural
and political processes we are engaged in. The past always plays a role in the
present – ‘for example, the consequences of colonisation persist and produce
further effects, in social life as well as in the memories of those affected, long
after the initial acts of settlement’ (Patton 1997: 5). Thus, the colonial past
which evolved from the initial Zionist–Palestinian encounter, continues to be
evident in the present, playing a role which cannot be ignored. This is because
the qualitative difference encapsulated in the Zionist colonial event did not
abdicate its position of dominance in the Zionist–Palestinian plane in favour
of new differences. Shafir’s main thesis in his seminal work on the origins of the
Zionist–Palestinian conflict (Shafir 1989) was that the logic of ethnic exclusion
adopted by the Zionist settlement at the start of the twentieth century emerged
from class struggles in the labour market. At this point, as I have already
argued elsewhere (Svirsky 2010), a collective desire producing displacementreplacement began to be assembled (I defined it as a desire for terra nullius).
This turning point continues to echo today. In other words, we cannot gain
a comprehensive understanding of the occupation regime without taking into
account the historical evolution of the colonial event of Zionism, and the ways in
which desire has been and is collectively put to work throughout this project. My
contention in this context is that the ‘appetite’ for land and the corresponding
effects of expropriation, dispossession and expulsion of Palestinians was already
an established and evolving Zionist habit well before 1967.
6. This is the case for example, with the civic-education official curriculum in highschools. The subject of the occupation is treated in the official book in two
sections: under the headings ‘The national schism’ and ‘The ideological schism’.
In both sections the territories appear with their biblical-recycled-Zionist names,
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7.
8.

9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.

15.

16.

Judea and Samaria, and the issue is totally detached from any discussion on the
relation of the occupation with the regime of Israel itself, and with its impact
on Israeli political culture or ways of life. Most sadly, the connection between
the maintenance of the occupation and the role the pupils studying this very
book will play in that effort is also absent. (See To Be Citizens in Israel: A
Jewish-Democratic State, Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1999, pp. 289–90;
332–45).
The legal integration of the Palestinians into Israel would have been detrimental
to Israel’s demographic desire to maintain a clear dominant Jewish majority.
The first colony was established as early as 1967. According to the
figures published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, in 2008 the
Israeli population in the West Bank colonies totalled 268,900, representing
approximately 3.75% of the total Israeli population.
As Azoulay and Ophir explain: ‘The Palestinian ceased to be he or she who is
subjected to power. His or her existence was reduced to that of a moving body
that interests the ruling power’ (Azoulay and Ophir 2009: 135).
‘In 1970, 5% of the Palestinian workforce was employed inside Israel or
by Israeli employers. By 1987, over 45% of the workforce provided 85%
of the Palestinian gross domestic product, which gradually created economic
dependence among Palestinians on the possibility of entry into Israel. This was
due to a relatively free passage of people and goods to and from the OPT
implemented in 1971 . . . [which] come to a temporary halt during the 1991 Gulf
war’ (and worsen afterwards as a response to the intifadas) (Shenav and Berda
2009: 338).
‘By 2007, Palestinian real per-capita income fell by 40% compared with its 1999
levels, and poverty rates soared to over 67% . . . Palestinian GDP has fallen by
30% over the past fifteen years’ (Farsakh 2009: 379, 398).
In the economic treaties of the Oslo Accords, Israel also secured itself an unfair
advantage, while bringing about yet further deterioration of the Palestinian
economy (Gordon 2008: 185–7).
See http://www.whoprofits.org/index.php. This website shows who profits from
the occupation.
Illegal or unauthorised outposts, as defined by the Sasson Report of March 2005
(submitted at the request of the Prime Minister’s Office), are small settlements in
the West Bank (there are more than a hundred) erected during the 1990s after
building in the Palestinian territories was frozen by the Rabin administration
(following the Oslo Accords). In the absence of an official governmental
decision, any establishment of a settlement in the occupied territories is illegal.
These outposts were built by groups of West Bank settlers in cooperation with
public institutions; the leitmotif of this phenomenon was simply the expansion
of the Jewish presence so as to make it impossible to reach a peace agreement.
The Oslo agreements defined three types of domination, combining civil control
and security: A, B and C. Territories of type A are under Palestinian control
(both civil and security); type B fall under Palestinian civil control, with Israel
controlling security; and type C are under total Israeli control. All roads and
border crossings remain under Israeli control.
I’m aware of Ilan Pappe’s critique of using Agamben’s paradigm to analyse the
occupation (Pappe 2008: 148–70), and I agree that Israel must not be seen as a
democratic polity corrupted to include exception for it never was a democracy
in any sense. But what is important for me in using Agamben’s paradigm is the
conceptual framework it provides for analysing relations of abandonment: what
characterised them, how are they maintained, by whom, and how they can be
transformed.
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17. Eyal Benvenisti wrote on the legal aspect of the absorption of the occupation.
See Benvenisti 1990.
18. Power is that which connects between subjects, objects, practices and systems,
transforming them from ‘sides’ into points of application.
19. I must say that, in a way, Gordon’s formula for change (power–excess–
contradictions–resistance and back again) appears to be a catch-all explanation
for any phenomenon, and thus fails to capture the uniqueness of the event of the
occupation.
20. The ‘Wall’ winding through the West Bank separates not only Israelis
from Palestinians, but ‘in many areas . . . actually separates Palestinians from
Palestinians’ and from their land, in violation of fundamental rights and serving
to ‘create facts on the ground whose aim is to undercut the Palestinian statebuilding project’ and to promote the annexation of lands by Israel (Gordon
2008: 213).
21. Al-Nakbah – Arabic for ‘The Calamity’ or ‘The Catastrophe’ – is the Arab name
for the Israeli war of independence of 1948–9, when nearly 800,000 Palestinians
were expelled from their homes by forces of the nascent Israeli state and their
lands seized, destroying about 550 villages and neighbourhoods, and devastating
the spine of Palestinian society.
22. For example, the ‘Separation Barrier’ – in reality, the Wall – through the West
Bank affects the Israeli soldiers charged with guarding it: ‘the Barrier transforms
the soldiers into an effect of its own logic . . . [becoming] in a sense, an automatic
weapon in the service of a concrete wall and a series of trenches and fences’
(Gordon 2008: 214–5).
23. See ‘The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (temporary provision)
5763–2003’ at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/citizenship_law.htm
24. The research and writing of this article was supported by a Marie Curie
Intra European Fellowship within the 7th European Community Framework
Programme.
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